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I. INTRODUCTION
Captain Steve Zissou t assembled his crew of oceanographic
explorers into the crowded confines of his deep-sea research vessel for
one purpose: to find the mysterious shark that ate his friend. Zissou, an
experienced and pompous seaman, had convinced investors to bankroll
his expedition in exchange for documentary footage of the rare "jaguar
shark." After spending weeks in unchartered waters with no sign of the
elusive predator, Zissou faced a mutiny from novice crewmembers who
began to doubt the existence of the shark altogether and urged the
overzealous Zissou to abandon the mission. In the final leg of the
journey, however, Zissou steered his crew into the depths of the ocean,
powered up his spotlight, and fixed his eyes upon the jaguar shark he
had finally discovered.
It is difficult to see what lies in the shadows, and prior to 2008,
federal regulators shied away from the shadow banking industry 2 that
had abused consumer trust with impunity.3  In response, Congress
created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-
Frank).4 In doing so, Congress effectively sent the CFPB into
unchartered waters with a spotlight to illuminate the predatory conduct
1. Steve Zissou is a character in THE LIFE AQUATIC (Touchstone Pictures 2004), on
which the Introduction to this Note in based.
2. "Shadow banking" has been defined as "a diverse set of institutions and markets
that, collectively, carry out traditional banking functions [] but do so outside, or in ways
only loosely linked to, the traditional system of regulated depository institutions." Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Some Reflections on the Crisis and the Policy
Response at the Russell Sage Foundation and the Century Foundation Conference on
"Rethinking Finance" (Apr. 13, 2012) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke20120413a.htm).
3. Regulatory Restructuring: Enhancing Consumer Financial Products Regulation:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of Rep. Maxine
Waters).
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 12
U.S.C. § 5491 (2012).
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that contributed to the financial crisis.
On July 3, 2013, the CFPB issued a final procedural rule5 (Final
Rule) to establish supervisory authority over certain risky nonbanks and
address unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts or practices in the shadow
banking system. 6  This Note will argue that the Final Rule offers a
practical, hands-off approach to consumer protection in markets for
consumer financial products and services while considering the rights of
nonbanks that have only recently found themselves in arms reach of
CFPB jurisdiction. This Note will proceed in four parts. Part II will
explain the CFPB's purpose and the scope of its nonbank supervision
program. Part III will provide an overview of the Final Rule.8 Part IV
will discuss the major criticisms of the Final Rule and its justification
within the context of the CFPB's objectives.9 Part V will conclude by
discussing the consequences to nonbanks and challenges ahead for the
CFPB. o
II. THE CFPB: PURPOSE, RULEMAKING AUTHORITY, AND SUPERVISION
A. Purpose: Leveling the Playing Field
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, Congress established the
CFPB to regulate consumer financial products and services more
effectively. 1 Bank regulators have the safety and soundness of
financial institutions as their primary concern,1 2 but "this approach
judges a bank's conduct toward consumers by its effect on the bank, not
5. Procedural Rule to Establish Supervisory Authority over Certain Nonbank Covered
Persons Based on Risk Determination, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352 (2013) [hereinafter Final Rule]
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1091).
6. See generally, David Reiss, Consumer Protection Out of the Shadows of Shadow
Banking: The Role of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &
COM. L, 131 (2012) (providing an overview of how the CFPB is designed to address
problems of shadow banking).
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
11. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), Pub.
L. No. 111-203, pmbl., 124 Stat. 1376, pmbl. (2010).
12. S. REP. No. 111-176, at 10 (2010) (testimony of Michael Barr, Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury for Financial Institutions, to the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, July 14, 2009).
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. . . on consumers." 13  Consumer protection was something of an
afterthought. 14 Nonbank providers of consumer financial products and
services were subject to little or no oversight, 5 and no federal agency
had supervision and examination authority over these institutions. 16
Fragmented jurisdiction prevented regulators from engaging in
meaningful oversight of consumer financial products and services
offered by both banks and nonbanks.17
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), for example,
traditionally had jurisdiction over nonbank financial institutions,' but
13. Id.
14. See Consumer Protections in Financial Services: Past Problems, Future Solutions:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 11Ith Cong. 10 (2009)
(testimony of Ellen Seidman, Senior Fellow, New America Foundation, Executive Vice
President, ShoreBank Corporation, and former Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision);
see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Financial Services Industry's Misguided Quest to
Undermine the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 881,
912 (2012) (noting that the "OCC is widely viewed as the most committed regulatory
champion for the interests of major banks"); Stacy Mitchell, Why Republicans Hate
Warren's CFPB But Love Another Bank Regulator, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 18, 2011,
10:32 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stacymitchell/why-republicans-hate-
warr b_837539.html ("The difference between the [CFPB and OCC] is that the OCC sees
its mission as protecting, not consumers, but big banks . . . ."); Joe Nocera, Letting the
Banks Off the Hook, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/opinion/19nocera.html?_r-0 ("The O.C.C. is a
coddler, a protector, an outright enabler of the institutions it oversees.. . . It has consistently
defended the Too Big to Fail banks."); Steven Pearlstein, The Big Banks' Best Friend in
Washington, WASH. POST (May 27, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/05/26/AR2009052603150.html ("[T]he too-big-to-fail crowd has
found an unapologetic advocate in John Dugan, the comptroller of the currency. . . .").
15. See How Will the CFPB Function Under Richard Cordray: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Servs. and Bailouts of Pub. and Private Programs of the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Reform, 112th Cong. 12-13 (2012) (prepared statement of
Richard Cordray, Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
16. Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency: A Cornerstone of America's
New Economic Foundation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 111th Cong, 151 (2009) [hereinafter Creating a Consumer Financial Protection
Agency] (responses to written questions of Sen. David Vitter from Michael S. Barr,
Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, Department of the Treasury) ("[T]he
Administration's goal was for there to be a [fjederal agency with the mission of consumer
protection. In the consumer financial products and services area, this agency is lacking; in
the nonbank sector, no [flederal agency has supervision and examination authority,
regardless of the mission, and in the banking sector, five different agencies share this
responsibility but each has safety and soundness as its primary mission. The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), on the other hand, does have its mission the protection of
retail investors .. . [but] needs additional authorities ... to provide the broader and more
effective oversight that is needed .....
17. See id.
18. Id. at 28 (testimony of Michael S. Barr, Assistant Secretary for Financial
Institutions, Department of the Treasury) (describing the structural deficiencies within the
336 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 18
as a law enforcement agency it was not structurally designed to
supervise the nonbank sector. 19 Unlike federal bank regulators, the
FTC lacked supervisory authority over nonbanks and could only act
through an enforcement action once a violation had occurred. 20  The
FTC did not conduct regular examinations of nonbanks, as state
regulators were the primary supervising entities.21 The level of
supervision was not as rigorous as that for depository institutions and
22
varied considerably from state to state.
As a new consumer watchdog, 23 the CFPB was established to
prevent unfair, deceptive, and abusive financial services practices and to
level the playing field between depository and non-depository
institutions that offer consumer financial products and services.24
Through consistent enforcement of federal consumer financial laws, the
CFPB's goal is to ensure that consumers have access to financial
products in fair, transparent, and competitive markets.25 The CFPB
FTC that have prevented meaningful supervision and examination over nonbanks in
financial markets).
19. Id. ("I think that [the FTC] has not had the tools to [regulate financial products]. It
is structurally not set up to supervise or examine the nonbank sector. It can only act long
after the fact with enforcement when it is too late-and that is just not enough.").
20. DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42572, THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, TITLE X: THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU 3 (2013) (discussing the nature of FTC authority over nonbank
financial institutions).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 8; see also Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services-
Consumer and Industry Perspectives: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th
Cong. 13 (2007) (statement of James C. Sivon, Barnett, Sivon & Natter PC) ("During the
recent problems in the mortgage market, lenders of all types engaged in questionable
practices. The institutions that have gone bankrupt because of their practices were State
licensed and supervised. This suggests that State supervisory resources were inadequate or
not adequately utilized.").
23. Wilmarth, Jr., supra note 14, at 882 (providing background on the role and mission
of the CFPB); Barack H. Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks on Signing the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010) (transcript available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-
street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act).
24. S. REP. No. 111-176, at 11 (2010) (describing the CFPB's goal to establish "a
basic, minimum federal level playing field" for all banks, as well as nonbanks that were
largely unregulated prior to Dodd-Frank); see also Implementing Wall Street Reform:
Enhancing Bank Supervision and Reducing Systematic Risk: Hearing Before S. Comm. on
Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 68 (2012) (prepared statement of Richard
Cordray, Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
25. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2012) (explaining the CFPB's purpose to "implement and,
where applicable, enforce federal consumer financial law consistently for the purpose of
ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and
services and that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent,
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operates under a mandate to supervise an array of bank and nonbank
institutions, prescribe rules to carry out its objectives, and draw from a
variety of tools at its disposal to level the playing field.26
B. Scope of Supervisory Authority: Nonbank Supervision Program
Dodd-Frank grants the CFPB supervisory authority over certain
bank and nonbank institutions.27 Supervision allows the CFPB to
assess compliance with the requirements of federal consumer financial
law, obtain information about the activities and compliance systems of
those entities, and assess risks to customers of financial products and
28services.28 It also permits the CFPB to request reports and conduct
examinations of nonbank institutions on a periodic basis. 29
With respect to banks, the CFPB may only supervise banks and
credit unions with more than $10 billion in assets.30 Banks with $10
billion or less in assets are still subject to CFPB regulations, but the
prudential banking regulators remain the primary supervisory and
enforcement powers. 3' Banking regulators examine those institutions to
determine compliance with CFPB rules that implement consumer
financial laws. 32
With respect to nonbanks, the CFPB has supervisory authority
over certain nonbank "covered persons," defined as any entity that
"engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or
service." 33  The CFPB may regulate nonbank entities that offer
consumer financial products or services within three specific categories:
private education lenders; payday lenders; and entities that provide
and competitive").
26. See generally id. § 5511-12.
27. Id. § 5514.
28. Id. § 5514(b)(1).
29. Id.
30. 12 U.S.C. § 5515(a) (2012) (defining scope of coverage for supervision of very
large banks, savings associations, and credit unions).
31. CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 15.
32. However, the CFPB does have some limited supervisory authority over smaller
depository institutions. See id.
33. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6); see also id. § 5517 (providing certain exemptions from the
CFPB's authority for, among others, merchants, retailers, and other sellers of non-financial
goods or services that provide credit for the sale of retail products; real estate brokers;
manufactured home and modular home retailers; accountants and tax preparers; attorneys;
persons regulated by a state insurance regulator; persons regulated by a state securities
commission; and certain auto dealers).
2014] 337
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mortgage-related services, such as mortgage origination, brokerage,
mortgage servicing, mortgage modification, and foreclosure relief
activities. 34  The CFPB may also supervise large participants35 of
consumer debt collection, 36 consumer reporting, 37 and student loan
servicing markets. 38
In addition to its authority to supervise certain types of
institutions, the CFPB may supervise nonbanks based on their conduct.
Section 5514(a)(1)(C) of Dodd-Frank grants the CFPB authority over
any nonbank covered person that
the Bureau has reasonable cause to determine, by order,
after notice to the covered person and a reasonable
opportunity for such covered person to respond, based
on [consumer complaints] or information from other
sources, that such covered person is engaging, or has
engaged, in conduct that poses risks to consumers with
regard to the offering or provision of consumer financial
products or services.3 9
Nonbank covered persons described in this section are not classified
based on institutional design or function, but rather by the risk
associated with the offering of a specific product or service. 40 Although
they are not identified with particularity, these potentially risky
nonbanks may nevertheless be subject to CFPB supervision and
34. Id. § 5514(a)(1)(A)-(E) (providing a list of "covered persons" subject to CFPB
authority and defining "mortgage companies" to include originators, brokers, servicers, and
loan modification or foreclosure relief services); see also Peggy Twohig & Steve
Antonakes, The CFPB launches its nonbank supervision program, CFPB BLOG (Jan. 5,
2012), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/blog/the-cfpb-launches-its-nonbank-supervision-
program/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) (providing an overview of "covered persons" within
section 5514 of Dodd-Frank); CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 13-17 (same).
35. See Defining Larger Participants of Certain Consumer Financial Product and
Service Markets, 12 C.F.R. §§ 1090.104-105 (2013) (defining "larger participants" within
the consumer reporting market and the consumer debt collection market).
36. Id. § 1090.104(a).
37. Id. § 1090.105(a).
38. Proposed Rule to Establish Supervisory Authority Over Larger Participants of the
Student Loan Servicing Market, 78 Fed. Reg. 18902 (proposed March 28, 2013) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1090).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(C) (2012) (emphasis added).
40. See id.
338 [Vol. 18
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examination.4
The discretion afforded by § 5514(a)(1)(C) provides the CFPB
with the latitude to evolve with the markets.42 Where thousands of
nonbank institutions comprise a significant portion of the financial
services industry,43 creating meaningful oversight through legislation
requires a proactive approach to address risky practices that would
otherwise remain in the shadows. 4 4 Dodd-Frank empowers the CFPB to
regulate consumer financial products or services that were not on the
market when the legislation was enacted, but may nevertheless pose
serious risks to consumers in future markets.45 Creating an agency that
only had the authority to address the problems of the past would have
been shortsighted.46
III. THE FINAL RULE: BRINGING RISKY NONBANKS UNDER CFPB
SUPERVISION
A. The CFPB's Rulemaking Authority and Goals for Consistency and
Transparency
The CFPB wields broad rulemaking powers and
41. See Kevin L. Petrasic & Amanda M. Jabour, Knowing When, Where and How to
Draw the Line Presents Significant Challenges for the CFPB's Nonbank Supervision
Program, BNA BANKING REPORT, Sept. 11, 2012 (discussing industry concerns over the
broad scope of CFPB authority over nonbank financial institutions).
42. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 11 (2010) (noting that "[t]he CFPB will have enough
flexibility to address future problems as they arise" rather than prescribing authority limited
to problems, such as mortgages, that were only readily identifiable in hindsight);
CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 16 (explaining that, flowing from its discretion to supervise
nonbanks based on risk determination, the CFPB has "the latitude to evolve with the
markets ... making it possible to regulate entities that offer consumer financial products or
services that were not in the marketplace when the Dodd-Frank Act was signed into law");
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2013 - FY 2017 4 (2013), available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/strategic-plan/#goall (describing the structure of the
CFPB within the context of its goal to "prevent financial harm to consumers while
promoting good practices that benefit them").
43. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 13 ("This month, the [CFPB] launched the first federal
nonbank supervision program, one of the central new authorities provided by the Dodd-
Frank Act. There are thousands of nonbank providers of financial products and services that
make up a significant portion of the consumer financial marketplace and affect millions of
Americans each year.").
44. See id. at 11 ("Experience has shown that consumer protections must adapt to new
practices and new industries.").
45. CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 16.
46. S. REP.No. 111-76, at 11.
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responsibilities. 47  Dodd-Frank generally authorizes the CFPB to
administer, enforce, and implement federal consumer financial laws.48
Under 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(1), the CFPB may prescribe rules and issue
orders and guidance wherever necessary or appropriate for it to carry
out its purposes and objectives. 49  To the extent that the CFPB's
rulemaking authority conflicts with that of another federal agency under
a specific provision of federal consumer financial law, the CFPB has
exclusive authority to prescribe rules pursuant to such provisions.5 0
In addition to its general rulemaking power, the CFPB has
specific authority under 12 U.S.C. § 5514(b)(7)(A) to write rules that
facilitate its nonbank supervision program.51 Although the Final Rule
was not necessary to implement § 5514(a)(1)(C), 52 the statutory
language within § 5514(b)(7)(A) indicates that Congress expected the
CFPB to issue rules that would appropriately develop a robust nonbank
supervision program.53 The CFPB issued the Final Rule with two
primary goals in mind. First, to create a consistent process applicable to
all affected nonbanks, echoing its larger goal of consistent enforcement
of federal consumer financial laws. 54 Second, to provide transparency
and guidance to nonbanks regarding the procedures the CFPB intends to
use prior to supervision.s
47. 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (2012).
48. Id. § 5512(a).
49. Id. § 5512(b)(1). In issuing its rules, however, the CFPB must consider the costs
and benefits to, and impact on, both nonbanks and consumers-particularly those
consumers in rural areas. See id. § 5512(b)(2)(A).
50. Id. § 5512(b)(4).
51. Id. § 5514(b)(7)(A).
52. See Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352, 40352 (July 3, 2013).
53. See 12 U.S.C. § 5514(b)(7)(A) (2012) ("The Bureau shall prescribe rules to
facilitate supervision of persons described in subsection (a)(1) and assessment and detection
of risks to consumers.") (emphasis added); see also Petrasic & Jabour, supra note 41 ("The
ability to regulate the previously unregulated is what distinguishes and defines the agency's
unprecedented powers, authority[,] and ability to formulate and execute consumer financial
protection policy on a nationwide basis.").
54. Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 40352 (explaining that, through Final Rule, the CFPB
sought to "establish a consent procedure applicable to all affected entities for bringing a
nonbank covered person under the Bureau's supervisory authority pursuant to 12 U.S.C.
5514(a)(1)(C). . .").
55. Id. (explaining the CFPB's goal of providing transparency to potentially affected
nonbanks under 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(C), as well as to the public).
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B. An Overview of the Procedure
1. Issuing a Notice of Reasonable Cause
The process begins with the CFPB issuing a Notice of
Reasonable Cause (Notice) to a nonbank target. 56 The Notice informs
the nonbank that the CFPB "may have reasonable cause to determine
that the respondent is a nonbank covered person that is engaging, or has
engaged, in conduct that poses risks to consumers with regard to the
offering or provision of consumer financial products or services." 5 The
Notice is based on consumer complaints" or information from other
sources, which may include, for example, judicial opinions and
administrative decisions. 59 The Notice itself includes a description of
the basis for the assertion, a statement informing the nonbank
respondent of its rights under the Final Rule, 60 and a summary of the
documents and other items that the official initiating the proceeding
relied on in issuing a Notice. 61 The Notice and all subsequent
proceedings prior to examination will be confidential. 62
2. A Nonbank's Response to the Notice
Once the Notice is served on the nonbank target, it has thirty
days to file a written response to the CFPB setting forth its basis for
56. Id. at 40375.
57. Id. at 40376 (emphasis added).
58. See 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(A) (2012) (describing the process for collecting and
tracking complaints, which requires the Director to establish a unit to provide a telephone
number, website, and database to collect, monitor, and respond to complaints).
59. Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352, 40359 (July 3, 2013).
60. See id. at 40376 (describing the rights of a respondent nonbank that will be
included in a Notice issued by the CFPB).
61. Id. ("A Notice of Reasonable Cause shall contain ... a summary of the documents,
records, or other items relied on by the initiating official to issue a Notice. Such summary
will be consistent with the protection of sensitive information, including compliance with
federal privacy law and whistleblower protections. . . .").
62. Id. ("In connection with a proceeding under this part,... all documents records or
other items submitted by a respondent to the Bureau, all documents prepared by, or on
behalf of, or for the use of the Bureau, and any communications between the Bureau and a
person, shall be deemed confidential supervisory information under 12 C.F.R.
1070.2(i)(1).").
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objection to the Notice, if any.6 The written response must include "all
documents, records, or other evidence a respondent wishes to use to
support the arguments or assertions set forth in the response."
Along with a written response, a respondent nonbank may also
request to present a supplemental oral response in support of its
position.65 However, the CFPB Associate Director may impose
limitations on the oral response including, but not limited to,
establishing a time frame for the presentation and limiting the subjects
that may be addressed.66 Discovery is not permitted and no witnesses
may be called to testify in connection with either the written response or
the supplemental oral response. 67
In responding to a Notice, waiver provisions apply in three
circumstances. First, a nonbank respondent's failure to raise an
argument or rely on a document in its response will constitute a waiver
of the right to do so in future proceedings. 68 Second, a failure to request
a supplemental oral response will also constitute a waiver of the
opportunity to do so. 69 Third, if a nonbank respondent fails to file a
written response within the thirty-day time frame, it waives the right to
respond to the Notice and subsequently authorizes the CFPB to continue
to the next step of the proceedings.70
3. Voluntary Consent to the CFPB's Authority
A respondent has the option to voluntarily consent to the
CFPB's supervisory authority and forego the right to contest its
designation as a nonbank covered person.7 1 A consent agreement form
is provided to the respondent in the Notice, but it does not provide the
respondent with an opportunity to bargain for specific terms. 72 Rather,
63. Id.
64. Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352, 40377 (July 3, 2013).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352, 40377 (July 3, 2013).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. (describing the process by which a nonbank may voluntarily consent to
CFPB supervision, which involves completing and executing a consent agreement form
provided to a nonbank respondent with a Notice issued by the CFPB).
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a respondent who signs the consent agreement thereby agrees to be
placed under the CFPB's supervision for an unspecified time period
without the option for a petition to terminate the order. Additionally,
if a respondent decides to enter into the consent agreement, he
subsequently waives any right to judicial review of the agreement. 7 4
4. Recommended Determination by the Associate Director
If the respondent does not voluntarily consent to the CFPB's
supervision, the Associate Director will then make a recommended
determination to the Director as to whether there is reasonable cause for
the CFPB to determine that the respondent is a nonbank covered person
that is engaging, or has engaged in, risky conduct. The recommended
determination will include either a proposed decision and order that
would subject a respondent to the CFPB's supervision if adopted by the
Director, or a proposed notification that a respondent should not be
subjected to the CFPB's supervisory authority based on the
proceedings. 76 If the latter is appropriate, it does not bar the CFPB from
issuing another Notice, even on the same grounds.77
5. Determination by the Director
Within forty-five days of receiving the recommended
determination, the CFPB Director will make a determination that either
adopts, modifies, or rejects the recommended determination. 78  The
Director must either issue a decision and order subjecting the nonbank
73. See id. at 40379 (noting that a nonbank respondent that voluntarily consents to
CFPB supervision will not be eligible for a petition of termination of supervision and
allowing a nonbank to file a petition to terminate supervision "no sooner than two years
after issuance of an order and no more frequently than annually thereafter" where a nonbank
has not voluntarily consented to supervision) (emphasis added).
74. Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352,40379 (July 3, 2013).
75. Id. at 40378 (describing the contents of the Associate Director's Recommended
Determination to be submitted to the Director).
76. Id.
77. See id. ("A proposed notification that a respondent should not be subjected to the
Bureau's supervisory authority .. . shall have no precedential effect and shall not prevent
the issuance of another Notice of Reasonable Cause pursuant to either section 1091.102, or
the procedures set forth in section 1091.111, at any time, or from issuance of a decision and
order based on another Notice recommending that a respondent be subject to the Bureau's
authority pursuant to either of those sections.").
78. Id. (describing the process for reaching a Determination).
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respondent to the CFPB's supervisory authority, or a notification to the
contrary. 79  Within his determination, the Director must include the
basis for the decision and a statement that the CFPB has reasonable
cause to determine that the respondent is a nonbank covered person that
is engaging, or has engaged, in conduct that poses risk to consumers.so
6. Examination and Post-Determination Termination
If a nonbank covered person is determined to be subject to the
CFPB's supervision, the CFPB may request reports and conduct
examinations periodically to assess compliance with federal consumer
financial laws; to obtain information about the institution's activities,
procedures, and compliance systems; and to detect and assess risks to
consumers of consumer financial products and services.' While a
nonbank may petition to terminate the order, it may do so no sooner
than two years after the order is issued, and no more frequently than
once annually thereafter.82
7. Option for Civil Action or Administrative Adjudication
The CFPB may, at its own discretion, decide to forego the
informal process just described and seek an order to bring the nonbank
under its supervision through a civil action or administrative
adjudication. If the CFPB elects to proceed in this manner, it must
still provide notice to the nonbank and allow for an opportunity to
respond, but it will not be required to adhere to the process previously
79. Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352, 40378 (July 3, 2013).
80. See id. (providing that any decision and order issued by the Director must also
include "[a] statement that the Director adopts the Associate Director's proposed decision
and order without revision as the Director's decision and order, or that the Director rejects
or modifies the Associate Director's proposed Determination for reasons set for by the
Director. . . ."); see also id. (content requirements for Determination).
81. 12 U.S.C. § 5514(b)(1) (2012).
82. Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 40379 ("Any person subject to an order issued pursuant
to [section] 1091.109(a)(1) may, no sooner than two years after issuance of such an order
and no more frequently than annually thereafter, petition the Director for termination of the
order.").
83. Id. ("Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit the relief the CFPB may seek
in any civil action or administrative adjudication, including but not limited to, seeking an
order to have a person deemed subject to the CFPB's supervisory authority under 12 U.S.C.
5514, including for the reasons set forth in 12 U.S.C. 5514(a)(1)(C).").
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set forth.84 A nonbank may also agree to enter into a consent order in
connection with an adjudication proceeding or civil action, but the
CFPB has the discretion to accept or reject such a request. 85
IV. REACTION To THE FINAL RULE
The CFPB has drawn criticism from those in the financial
services industry who are concerned over the Final Rule's potentially
broad implications. 86  Standing alone, the Final Rule provides
considerable latitude to the CFPB to supervise nonbank financial
institutions, and viewed collectively with the CFPB's other nonbank
supervisory powers, "we see an agency with unprecedented and
unparalleled power to oversee the operations of nonbank financial
firms."8 7  In conjunction with its supervisory power over large bank
consumer financial operations, the CFPB's nonbank powers effectively
enable it to establish a national policy for consumer financial
protection.
Nonbanks are concerned with the regulatory burdens imposed
upon those subject to CFPB supervision, the uncertainty of CFPB
action, and the disproportional impact that cost of compliance will have
on smaller institutions. 89 Along these same lines, critics urge that even
84. Id. ("If the Bureau proceeds pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section, the provisions
of [sections] 1091.101 through 1091.110, and [sections] 1091.113 through 1091.115 will be
inapplicable to such proceeding.").
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Daniel P. Weitzel & Douglas P. Faucette, CFPB Establishes Procedures
Relating to Supervisory Authority Over Certain Nonbanks, LocKE LoRD QUICK STUDY (July
12, 2013), available at http://www.lockelord.com/files/Publication/8a274803-9115-44fe-
a602-103efd66bbbb/Preview/PublicationAttachment/c7 1e927b-74bb-40cb-98aa-
16fe874556de/bankregtran_2013-07_11th _CFPBRegulates Weitzel.pdf (predicting that the
market impact of the Final Rule will be "broad and deep" and is likely to create a
heightened degree of uncertainty in the marketplace).
87. Petrasic & Jabour, supra note 41.
88. Id.
89. See Open For Business: The Impact of the CFPB on Small Business: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations, Oversight and Regulations of the H. Comm. on
Small Bus., 112th Cong. 6 (2011) [hereinafter Open For Business] (testimony of Daniel
Fleming, President, Fleming Leasing, Alexandria, Va.) (explaining that small businesses
anticipate having to hire clerks to comply with data collection requirements, which is a
significant investment for many smaller institutions); see also Letter from Stuart K. Pratt,
President and CEO, Consumer Data Indus. Ass'n, to Monica Jackson, Admin. Specialist,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July 24, 2012) ("Preparation costs alone are significant, even if
an exam does not occur. . . . Regardless of whether a rule setting standards for supervision
imposes 'substantive conduct requirements,' it continues to be the case that any covered
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the mere threat of CFPB supervision could have a chilling effect on the
industry and stifle innovation within the market for consumer financial
products and services.90 In addition to such potential repercussions,
nonbanks question whether the Final Rule provides them with a
reasonable opportunity to respond, or whether unbridled CFPB
discretion makes supervision imminent. 9 1
A. Major Criticisms of the Final Rule
1. A Subjective Standard for Risk Determination
The public comments that the CFPB received in connection with
the Final Rule express concern over the standard it intends to use for
risk determination. 92 Because the CFPB may only supervise nonbanks
that it has reasonable cause to determine pose risks to consumers,
nonbanks are understandably anxious for guidance as to what qualifies
as "risk." 93 This concern is further justified by the fact that most of the
nonbank institutions subject to the Final Rule were previously
unregulated and have a limited understanding of their responsibilities
and expectations under Dodd-Frank. 94
As one commenter noted, consumer financial products and
person that may be subject to supervision will incur significant expenses preparing for
possible supervision, whether or not a particular person is ever examined. Even a fully
compliant covered person will expend substantial resources once supervisory authority is
established over it."); see also Letter from Lisa S. McGreevy, President and CEO, Online
Lenders Alliance, to Monica Jackson, Admin. Specialist, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July
24, 2012) (expressing similar concern over the high costs associated with supervision).
90. Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 856, 900-04, 917-23 (2013) (discussing the negative impact of the
CFPB regarding abuse to rulemaking authority and its failure to adequately consider the
costs and benefits to financial service providers and consumers); see also Brittany M. Pace,
An Unanticipated Consequence: Will Dodd-Frank Drown Out Small Businesses?, 8 OHIO
ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 159, 171 (2013) (discussing disadvantages for small
businesses under the Dodd-Frank Act, in particular that small businesses spend a
disproportionate amount to comply with federal regulations-thirty-six percent more per
employee than larger institutions-yet have fewer resources available).
91. See Letter from Nat'l Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass'n to Monica Jackson, Admin.
Specialist, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July 24, 2012).
92. See, e.g., Letter from Andrew M. Beato & Jed Wulfekotte, Retained Counsel, ACA
Int'l, to Monica Jackson, Admin. Specialist, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July 24, 2012).
93. See 12 U.S.C. § 5514(a)(1)(C) (2012).
94. See Beato & Wulfekotte, supra note 92.
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services are inherently risky. 95  Personal loans, mortgages, auto-
financing, and other similar products all pose some degree of risk to the
consumer, 96 and perhaps no transaction involving a consumer financial
product or service is risk-free. 97  Commenters contend that Congress
could not have intended risk in this broad sense to be the standard for a
reasonable cause determination.98  Therefore, they urged the CFPB to
define "risk" in a manner that would provide clear guidance as to the
type of conduct that would subject a nonbank to supervision. 99
2. Unverified Complaints and Information May Lead to a Notice that is
a "False Alarm"
The Final Rule contains no provision that requires the CFPB to
verify the validity and accuracy of the information it receives from
consumer complaints and other sources before issuing a Notice.100
Without a vetting mechanism for neutralizing fraudulent or baseless
complaints, nonbank proponents argue that the complaint system may
be subject to abuse by advocacy groups, competitors, "confused
consumers,"' 0 ' and even bloggers who have no intention of using the
system for its designated purpose.102 The same could also be said for
95. Letter from Bill Himpler, Exec. Vice President, Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n, to Monica
Jackson, Admin. Specialist, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July 24, 2012); see also Pratt,
supra note 89.
96. Himpler, supra note 95.
97. Pratt, supra note 89.
98. Himpler, supra note 95.
99. Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352,40357 (July 3, 2013).
100. See id. at 40358-59 (declining to revise the Proposed Rule to require the CFPB to
verify complaints or to identify information from "other sources" that provide the basis of a
Notice); see also id. at 40376 (describing the contents of a Notice).
101. See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE: A
SNAPSHOT OF COMPLAINTS RECEIVED (2012),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201206-cfpb-shapshot complaints-received.pdf
(explaining "Consumer Confusion" as it applies to the market for financial products and
services and suggesting that nonbanks will not be penalized for consumer confusion).
102. See, e.g., Himpler, supra note 95; Letter from Wendy Harp-Lewis, Chief
Compliance Officer, Vice President Corp. Legal, Intelispend Prepaid Solutions, to Monica
Jackson, Admin. Specialist, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July 18, 2012); Letter from Louis
S. Freedman, President, Nat'l Ass'n of Retail Collection Attorneys, to Monica Jackson,
Admin. Specialist, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July 24, 2012); Letter from Kirsten Trusko,
President and Exec. Dir., The Network Branded Prepaid Card Ass'n, to Monica Jackson,
Admin. Specialist, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July 20, 2012); Letter from David C. Jones,
President, Ass'n of Indep. Consumer Credit Counseling Agencies, to Monica Jackson,
Admin. Specialist, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July 24, 2012).
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"information from other sources" where it may be difficult to verify the
accuracy and context of the information given the range of sources the
CFPB may consider. 103
Additionally, critics claim there are no stops in place to prevent
the CFPB from basing a Notice on complaints that have already been
resolved by the nonbank institution.' 04 Where a substantial number of
complaints alleging major transgressions and consumer risks may be
sufficient to trigger a Notice, critics urge that there should be a
substantial effort to verify the accuracy of such information or that the
information be provided to a nonbank target before the CFPB uses such
information as a basis for asserting its supervisory authority. 0 5
Otherwise, as critics point out, it would be difficult for a nonbank to
object to a Notice where it does not know why its conduct has been
classified as risky. 106
Furthermore, critics argue that consumer complaints may not be
an accurate gauge of the financial industry's compliance level with
consumer protection laws.107 It may be the case that the CFPB issues a
Notice even where a nonbank has taken steps to disclose risks in its
financial products or services without having violated any law or
regulation.' 08  The very nature of complaints, which are often
derogatory, aggressive, and without proper context, poses an inherent
risk of the CFPB issuing Notices that are merely "false alarms."' 09 In
this regard, examining the number of complaints against a nonbank
exacerbates the threat. For example, 100 complaints against a small
103. See, e.g., Himpler, supra note 95. It is worth mentioning, however, that other
federal agencies (OCC, FRB, FDIC, OTS, NCAU, and FTC) published a final rule to
enhance the accuracy and integrity of information furnished to consumer reporting agencies
under § 312 of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act. They found that the
percentage of frivolous or irrelevant disputes could range from 25 percent to 94 percent. See
74 Fed. Reg. 31484 (2009) (codified at scattered sections throughout Code of Federal
Regulations).
104. See, e.g., Harp-Lewis, supra note 102.
105. See, e.g., Himpler, supra note 95; Trusko, supra note 102 (expressing concern over
presumption of guilt in the proceedings based on inaccurate information collected by the
CFPB); Jones, supra note 102; Letter from Eric D. Harris, MoneyGram, to Monica Jackson,
Admin. Specialist, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July 24, 2012).
106. Beato & Jed Wulfekotte, supra note 92.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Freedman, supra note 102; Letter from Steven A. Salzer, Exec. Vice President
and Gen. Counsel, Pub. Serv. Credit Union, to Cathy Burke, Office of the Exec. Sec'y,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July 24, 2012).
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nonbank could have much more significance than the same number of
complaints against a larger entity. 0 Similarly, 100 complaints about
lawfully permissible debt collection should be distinguished from 100
complaints of actual wrongdoing."' Commenters agree that if the
complaints are not furnished to a nonbank target, then a more
comprehensive evaluation of the complaints seems in order to allow
respondents an opportunity to develop an appropriate response.1 2
The nature of the CFPB's complaint system may also prove
problematic for a nonbank filing a response to a Notice. When an
institution makes its written response to the allegations, it must set forth
all of its arguments and present all documents and evidence on which it
plans to base its contentions." 3 Otherwise, a nonbank waives the right
to rely on an argument or document in future proceedings. 114 Yet the
CFPB may be requesting a response based on an enormous amount of
material that has to be reviewed, compiled, and delivered in a relatively
short timeframe." 5 When only a summary of the CFPB's information
is available to a nonbank, critics are concerned that the summary may
lack specific details that would otherwise allow for a comprehensive
response.116 A nonbank may be inclined to submit more information
than necessary to respond to the CFPB's Notice," 7 or it may fail to
include an important piece of evidence addressing a specific document
that was only included in summary fashion. Institutions may ultimately
find themselves under the CFPB's supervision because a document not
included in a written response could have demonstrated that supervision
was unnecessary.
In a similar vein, the Final Rule's waiver provisions heighten
the concerns expressed over the complaint system. The CFPB notes
that the waiver provision helps ensure that it is aware of all relevant
110. Letter from Jan Stieger, Exec. Dir., DBA Int'l, to Monica Jackson, Admin.
Specialist, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July 24, 2012).
111. Id.
112. Himpler, supra note 95; Harris, supra note 105.
113. Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352, 40377 (July 3, 2013).
114. Id.
115. Trusko, supra note 102 (expressing concern over substantive matters to be
addressed within twenty-day time frame). But see Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 40363
(amending the time period for a response from twenty days to thirty days).
116. See Trusko, supra note 102.
117. See Letter from Commercial Law League of Am., to Monica Jackson, Admin.
Specialist, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July 24, 2012).
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issues that a respondent wishes to rely upon at the earliest opportunity
before reaching a determination." 8 While it may be inefficient to have
a respondent submit evidence to the CFPB on a rolling basis, it may be
effective to consider additional evidence arising after a nonbank's
response before both sides expend resources pursuant a Notice that is
merely a "false alarm."" 9
3. An Inadequate Opportunity to Respond Through the Informal
Proceedings
Nonbanks are concerned that the informal nature of the
proceedings will not afford them an adequate opportunity to respond.120
Accordingly, some would prefer an option for formal adjudication
under the Final Rule.121 If the CFPB has the authority to bring a civil
action against a nonbank respondent, critics argue, then nonbanks
should also have the option for formal adjudication.1 22  Moreover,
without the option to conduct discovery or call witnesses to support its
position in a written or supplemental oral response,123 a nonbank may
view formal adjudication as a worthwhile cost to provide greater
procedural protections in an effort to avoid supervision.
Beyond the potential expenses incurred in examination,
preparation costs alone may be significant-especially for smaller
institutions. 124 Considering the staffing and resource constraints within
smaller nonbanks, the informal process may impose a substantial
burden on companies who may be unaware that they are within the
boundaries of the CFPB's supervisory authority and are less likely to
have counsel capable of responding to a Notice within the requisite
timeframe.1 25 Moreover, it seems unclear what types of reports and
118. Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352, 40365 (July 3, 2013) (explaining purpose of
waiver provisions).
119. The Final Rule does not specifically address whether the CFPB may consider
additional information it receives in reaching a Determination after a nonbank has filed a
response. See id. at 40378 (describing the process that the Associate Director and the
Director will use to reach a Determination).
120. See, e.g., Nat'l Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass'n, supra note 91.
121. Harp-Lewis, supra note 102; Trusko, supra note 102.
122. Harp-Lewis, supra note 102.
123. See Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352,40377 (July 3, 2013).
124. Pratt, supra note 89.
125. Himpler, supra note 95.
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examinations will be required for a nonbank supervised by the CFPB,
and the difficulty in predicting its obligations may impose additional
hardship. 126
Although nonbank respondents have the option to voluntarily
consent to CFPB supervision, there is hardly an incentive to do so. A
consent agreement provides a unilateral benefit to the CFPB with no
discernable benefit to the nonbank target.127 It allows the CFPB to
impose an indefinite examination period rather than a two-year
minimum, which raises questions as to why entities that voluntarily
consent to the CFPB's authority should be subject to harsher
treatment.128 Regardless of whether a nonbank consents to supervision,
critics argue, nonbanks should have the opportunity to petition for
termination of the order once it discontinues the alleged risky practice
since additional examination beyond that point would seem
meaningless.129 Additionally, waiving any right to judicial review of
the consent agreement may be seen as "an inappropriate and indefinite
surrender of access to the judicial system as a condition of voluntary
cooperation." 30
B. Defending the Final Rule in Light of the CFPB's Mission to Level the
Playing Field
1. Providing Additional Guidance for Risk Determination May
Undermine CFPB Objectives
While the CFPB's standard for risk determination may be
initially frustrating to nonbanks looking for a safe harbor, providing
such specific guidance in the Final Rule may be premature. The CFPB
is responsible for consistently enforcing consumer financial protection
laws-especially in innovative markets for consumer financial products
and services.131 Congress established a broad standard for the CFPB's
risk determination analysis, but without a clear understanding of how it
126. Commercial Law League of Am., supra note 117.
127. See Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 40378-79.
128. Jones, supra note 102.
129. Harris, supra note 105.
130. Jones, supra note 102.
131. See S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 11 (2010).
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applies in particular facts and circumstances, the CFPB is careful not to
create exceptions that may backfire as markets for new financial
products and services develop.
All covered persons are legally required to refrain from
engaging in unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices (UDAAP) in
violation of Dodd-Frank. '32 The CFPB's supervisory authority is one
avenue it may take for detecting and assessing risks to consumers and to
markets for consumer financial products and services. 133 Consistent
with the objectives of Dodd-Frank,13 4 in evaluating "risk to consumers"
for its reasonable cause determination the CFPB intends to consider
practices that involve "potentially unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or
practices, or ... conduct that otherwise potentially violates applicable
[flederal consumer financial law." 35
The standard for unfairness involves a three-part test. An act or
practice is unfair when: (1) it causes or is likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers; (2) the injury is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers; and (3) the injury is not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition.136 Substantial injury typically
132. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CFPB BULL. No. 2013-07, PROHIBITION OF UNFAIR,
DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES IN THE COLLECTION OF CONSUMER DEBTS
(2013).
133. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL (2012)
[hereinafter SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL], available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/20121 0_cfpb.supervision-and-examination-manual-
v2.pdf.
134. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b) (2012) (describing objectives of the CFPB in exercising
its authority to ensure "consumers are provided with timely and understandable information
to make responsible decisions about financial transactions; consumers are protected from
unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices and from discrimination; outdated,
unnecessary, or unduly burdensome regulations are regularly identified and addressed in
order to reduce unwarranted regulatory burdens; (flederal consumer financial law is
enforced consistently, without regard to the status of a person as a depository institution, in
order to promote fair competition; and markets for consumer financial products and services
operate transparently and efficiently to facilitate access and innovation"). But see Final
Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352, 40358 (July 3, 2013) ("[A]lthough not expressly applicable to an
(a)(1)(C) proceeding, the Bureau may consider the (b)(2) factors to the extent applicable in
making a reasonable-cause determination.").
135. Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 40357 (explaining, generally, the type of conduct the
CFPB will consider in evaluating risks to consumers for purposes of 12 U.S.C. §
5514(a)(1)(c)).
136. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL, UDAAP
1-2 (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb-supervision-and-
examination-manual-v2.pdf [hereinafter UDAAP]. The CFPB's unfairness standard under
Dodd-Frank is the same standard articulated in the FTC Act. Compare 12 U.S.C. §
5531(c)(1) (2012) with 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). See also FED. TRADE COMM., FTC POLICY
STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS (1980), available at http://www.ftc.gov/flc-policy-statement-
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involves monetary harm including, for example, costs or fees paid by a
consumer resulting from an unfair practice.' 37  However, consumers
must not be able to reasonably avoid the injury. 138 The question is not
whether a consumer could have made a better choice, but whether an act
or practice hinders a consumer's decision making, for example, by
denying them access to important information to compare alternatives
and select the best available option.' 39 Finally, to be unfair, the act or
practice must be "injurious in its net effects." 40 Taking into account
costs that would be incurred to prevent the injury,141 the injury must not
be outweighed by any offsetting consumer or competitive benefits, such
as lower prices, wider availability of products, or services resulting
from competition. 142
Although Congress has not defined "deceptive" with regards to
UDAAP, the CFPB adopted its deception standard from the FTC. 143 A
representation, omission, act or practice is deceptive when it misleads or
is likely to mislead a consumer; the consumer's interpretation of the
representation, omission, act or practice is reasonable under the
circumstances; and the misleading representation, omission, act, or
practice is material.144 Whether the overall impression is misleading or
deceptive depends on the context of a transaction, course of dealing, or
advertisement, and must be evaluated from the perspective of a
reasonable member of the target audience.1 45 Information is material if
it is likely to affect a consumer's choice of, or conduct regarding, the
product or service.146 Inadequate disclosures of material lease terms in
on-unfairness (adopting unfairness standard in consumer transactions).
137. UDAAP, supra note 136, at 2. Even an act that causes a small amount of harm to a
large number of people may be considered to cause substantial injury. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 3.
141. Such costs may include, for example, costs to the institution in taking preventative
measures and costs of increased burden to society as a whole. Id
142. UDAAP, supra note 136, at 3.
143. However, while it is clear that "deceptive" means something different than "unfair"
or "abusive," the CFPB concedes that it is not aware of any conduct that would be
"deceptive" and not also "unfair" or "abusive." The Semi-Annual Report of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 14
(2012) [hereinafter Semi-Annual Report].
144. UDAAP, supra note 136, at 5.
145. Id. at 5-6.
146. Id. at 6. Express claims made with respect to a financial product or service, as well
as information regarding the central characteristics of a product or service including costs,
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television advertising and misrepresentation about loan terms, for
example, have previously resulted in FTC action and are equally as
likely to trigger the deceptive standard when considered by the
CFPB. 147
Congress added "abusive" as a UDAAP component to create a
broader standard beyond the FTC's authority to regulate nonbanks
engaging in "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." 148 An abusive act or
practice is one that
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to
understand a term or condition of a consumer
financial product or service; or
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of-
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the
consumer of the material risks, costs, or
conditions of the product or service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the
interests of the consumer in selecting or
using a consumer financial product or
service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a
covered person to act in the interests of the
consumer. 149
"Abusive" means something other than unfair or deceptive, but
Congress's definition is situational and subjective. 150 To a large extent,
it appears to be a "facts and circumstances" test,151 and CFPB Director
Richard Cordray has emphasized that "reasonableness" is a factor
benefits, or restrictions on the use or availability, for example, is presumed to be material.
Implied claims, on the other hand, "are presumed to be material where evidence shows that
the institution intended to make the claim." Id.
147. UDAAP, supra note 136, at 7.
148. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012).
149. 12 U.S.C. §5531(d) (2012).
150. Semi-Annual Report, supra note 143, at 14 (testimony of Richard Cordray,
Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) (explaining the "abusive" standard used
for risk determination).
151. Id. (explaining that most good businesses will recognize an abusive practice when
they see one).
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particularly relevant to the standard.152
While the CFPB may further define "abusive,"l 53 not only does
it run the risk of contradicting Congress,' 54 but providing more
substantive guidance for risk determination at this stage would
undermine its mission to address risky practices that have yet to be
identified.'5 5 In order to craft effective policy to level the playing field,
agency rules must be broad enough so that they are not easily
circumvented, but narrow enough so as not to limit consumers' options
in purchasing financial products or services.156 This balancing act has
led other regulators, such as the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), to
address potentially unfair and deceptive practices through case-by-case
examinations, rather than through rulemaking.' 57 Accordingly, without
prior case law or guidance from the FTC, the CFPB may similarly resort
to its examination function over other nonbanks as a tool to
appropriately develop the abusive standard. 5 1
152. Id.; see also Kevin L. Petrasic & Amanda J. Kowalski, The New UDAAP: The
CFPB "Abusive" Standard - Will You Know It When You See It?, STAY CURRENT (June
2013), available at
http://www.paulhastings.com/Resources/Upload/Publications/The NewUDAAP_-
The CFPB_"Abusive" Standard - WillYouKnowItWhenYouSee_ILt.pdf
(discussing the lack of guidance regarding the CFPB's abusive standard within UDAAP).
153. See SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 133 ("Public policy, as
established by statute, regulation, judicial decision, or agency determination, may be
considered with all other evidence to determine whether an act or practice is unfair.").
154. Semi-Annual Report, supra note 143, at 14 (testimony of Richard Cordray,
Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
155. See H. Comm. On Fin. Servs. Holds A Hearing On The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau Report, 112th Cong. 15 (2012) [hereinafter CFPB Report Hearing]
(testimony of Richard Cordray, Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau)
(responding to a question from Chairman Bachus regarding whether the CFPB should
provide further guidance to the "abusive" standard, Cordray stated, "No, I don't think so. I
just don't think that is probably the preferred approach, when Congress has defined the term
already. We could further define the term, but are we going to define it differently from
what Congress defined? I don't think so. We could perhaps clarify how it applies in
particular facts and circumstances. But I think we ought to take some time with it, rather
than up and just pontificating about it at the beginning .. . We are trying to be careful, here,
measured and thoughtful. Sometimes that means you don't have all the answers in the first
instance").
156. Improving Consumer Protection in Financial Services, Hearing Before the H
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 13 (2007) (statement of the Honorable Randal S.
Kroszner, Governor, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (describing the
nature of effective agency rulemaking authority).
157. Id. (noting that both the FRB and FTC have addressed potentially unfair and
deceptive practices through case by case determinations rather than rulemaking because of
the challenges in crafting effective rules).
158. See Open For Business, supra note 89, at 6 (testimony of Dan Sokolov, Deputy
Associate Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) ("It can be challenging to
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Otherwise, explicitly delineating substantive standards for risky
conduct may inadvertently carve out an exceptional safe haven for
nonbanks that may pose risks to consumers through innovative products
and services in consumer financial markets. In recognition of the
CFPB's mission to illuminate harmful misconduct in the shadow
banking industry, restricting the scope of authority at this stage would
undercut its flexible and proactive approach to consumer protection. 159
Even if it means the CFPB does not have all of the answers at this point,
clarifying the standard over time is a more "measured and thoughtful"
approach. 160
2. An Informal Mechanism to Verify Complaints and Other Sources of
Information
Many of the concerns regarding the threat of the CFPB using
inaccurate information are misplaced. The data collection phase is not
intended to determine whether a nonbank has violated federal consumer
protection laws or harmed consumers,' 61 and it can hardly be assumed
identify the full range of [abusive] acts and practices in an economy as large as ours. We
are going to use all available sources of information, though, to see where risks to
consumers may lie and where compliance risks lie. And our sources of information will
include, as I mentioned, our examination function, which is one of the important tools that
Congress provided us and a tool that we can use to try to provide a level playing
field. . . ."); see also Zywicki, supra note 90, at 918 ("[T]he terms 'unfair' and 'deceptive'
incorporate, at least as an initial matter, the definitions of those terms built up over a long
period of time by the FTC."); John E. Villafranco & Kristin A. McPartland, New Agency,
New Authority: An Update on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, THE ANTITRUST
SOURCE 1, 5 (Feb. 2012),
http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/articles/1554/_res/id=Files/index=0/click.pdf
(noting that the CFPB will likely interpret the terms "unfair" and "deceptive" in a similar
manner as the FTC's definitions); Thomas P. Vartanian, Will CFPB Make Policy via Rules -
or Enforcement?, Am. BANKER, Nov. 14, 2011, available at
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/will-cfpb-make-policy-via-rules-or-
enforcement- 1044071-1 .html (explaining the strategic advantage of de facto rulemaking
through enforcement to avoid procedural limitations inherent in formal agency rulemaking).
159. See S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 11 (2010) (discussing the flexible structure of the
CFPB to "address future problems as they arise"); Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352, 40357
(July 3, 2013) (declining to provide a safe harbor in the Final Rule from a reasonable-cause
determination).
160. CFPB Report Hearing, supra note 155, at 15 (testimony of Richard Cordray,
Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau).
161. Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352, 40359 (July 3, 2013) ("[The] process is not
intended to determine whether a nonbank covered person has, in fact, violated applicable
Federal consumer financial laws or harmed consumers. The level of inquiry necessary to
make a finding of a violation of law would instead, occur, ... in the course of supervisory
activity such as an examination.").
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that the CFPB blindly bases a Notice solely on the number of
complaints it receives. Rather, the CFPB intends to consider, among
other things, the nature of the conduct relating to the complaints or other
information, the severity of the risk alleged, and the number of
consumers potentially affected.162 Taken together, these factors afford
nonbanks a level of protection in weeding out frivolous complaints and
minimizing the danger of equating the number of complaints against a
nonbank with the risks actually posed to consumers. 163
More importantly, although it is not expressly described as a
verification process, providing a nonbank with an opportunity to
respond through a written and supplemental oral response serves the
same function for verifying the information used for risk determination.
Unless a document contains confidential or otherwise personally
identifiable information, the CFPB places complaints in a public
database and, therefore, nonbank respondents should typically have
access to copies of the information the CFPB relied on to issue a
Notice.164 If there is an incentive to address allegations at the outset of
the process, then regardless of whether the specific complaints or
information are provided to the nonbank, they would be advised to offer
all relevant documentation and evidence that may be pertinent to the
inquiry. Not only is this procedure common practice within
administrative investigation,165 but it allows the CFPB to streamline the
determination process through a diluted cross-examination mechanism.
The CFPB combines verification and response into a single phase,
allowing the agency to determine where supervision is needed, and
where conduct is not risky enough to warrant the cost of examination.
Yet even those institutions that remain skeptical of this informal
verification method have an independent opportunity to proactively
address their concerns about inaccurate complaints. Since the entire
162. See id. (describing the factors the CFPB intends to consider with regard to
complaints in deciding whether there is a sufficient basis to issue a Notice).
163. See id. ("The Bureau is committed to using its limited resources where most
needed and intends to consider complaints and information from other sources with the
efficient use of Bureau resources in mind.").
164. Id. at 40361; see Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 77 Fed. Reg.
37558, 37568 (June 22, 2012) (explaining the CFPB's policy regarding public access to
certain consumer complaints).
165. See, e.g., SEC. AND ExCH. CoMM., How INVESTIGATIONS WORK,
http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1 356125787012#.Us37XX1GIHw (last
updated July 15, 2013).
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process is data-driven, nonbanks are advised to develop their own
comprehensive complaint system to file, track, and resolve consumer
complaints internally. 166 Reviewing consumer complaints to identify
patterns will allow nonbanks to develop a strong compliance program to
internally examine practices for potentially unfair, deceptive, or abusive
conduct.167  Addressing the problem upfront decreases the likelihood
that disgruntled consumers will file separate complaints with the CFPB
and will subsequently minimize the threat of CFPB supervision. This
recommended action may have been an intended consequence by the
CFPB, allowing it to retain a broad jurisdictional scope while
recognizing the practical limitations of directly supervising every
nonbank financial institution.1 6 8
3. The Final Rule Provides Nonbanks with an Opportunity to Contest
Supervision
The Final Rule addresses the threshold question of whether the
CFPB has the authority to supervise the nonbank entity. Dodd-Frank
explicitly grants the CFPB supervisory authority over certain nonbank
institutions, 169 which effectively requires them to leave their doors open
to the CFPB for examinations. 170 However, such authority exists in the
context of § 5514(a)(1)(C) only where the CFPB, after providing notice
and an opportunity to respond, has reasonable cause to determine that a
nonbank poses a risk to consumers. 171 Accordingly, prior to any
166. Leonard N. Chanin, How to Avoid Enforcement Actions for Unfair or Deceptive
Acts and Practices, BANKING DAILY (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://news.bna.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/bdln/BDLNWB/split-display.adp?fedfid=3650185
3&vname=bbdbulallissues&split-0 (recommending a strong internal compliance program to
proactively address potential UDAAP issues because regulatory agencies expect institutions
to have robust compliance systems, monitor practices, and take remedial action, although
"[d]oing so may not always prevent agency action, . . . even agency staff are human").
167. Id.
168. See Petrasic & Jabour, supra note 41 (noting that the uncertainty in how far the
CFPB may stretch to gain supervisory authority over a nonbank appears intentional for the
CFPB to achieve its statutory mandate).
169. See 12 U.S.C. § 5514 (2012) (describing nonbank covered persons subject to CFPB
supervisory authority); see also Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352, 40352 (July 3, 2013)
(providing that nonbank entities are subject to applicable federal consumer financial laws
regardless of whether they are subject to the CFPB's supervisory authority).
170. See 12 U.S.C. § 5514 (authorizing the CFPB to supervise certain nonbanks to
assess compliance with federal consumer financial laws, obtain information regarding
activities and compliance systems, and assess risks to consumers).
171. Id. § 5514(a)(1)(C).
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examination or any service of compulsory process, a nonbank has an
opportunity to challenge the CFPB's supervisory authority altogether.1 72
Moreover, the informal proceedings provide a less expensive
alternative to a more formal, rigid process of investigation employed by
other regulators. 173 Neither the CFPB nor a nonbank respondent is
forced to invest significant time or resources until after the CFPB can
demonstrate its basis for authority. 174 While other regulatory agencies
such as the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the
FTC may offer a more robust opportunity for rebuttal, it is only within
the context of formal adjudications and civil proceedings that these
protections exist. Section 5514(a)(1)(C) does not require that a nonbank
have the same opportunity to respond that it would in a formal
proceeding because the Final Rule does not affect the substantive rights
of any nonbank covered person.175 Supervision alone does not impose a
penalty on a nonbank covered person, nor does it deprive a nonbank of
any property or restrict its ability to engage in a viable business.176
Regardless of whether nonbanks are subject to the CFPB's supervisory
authority, they are still subject to federal consumer financial laws and
CFPB enforcement power.177
V. CONCLUSION: FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR THE CFPB AND
CONSEQUENCES TO NONBANKS
The Final Rule serves as a spotlight for the CFPB to penetrate
the shadow banking system to proactively address risky practices in
emerging markets for consumer financial products and services. The
CFPB's supervisory jurisdiction is directed toward filling the gaps
created by prior regulatory fragmentation and "larger participant"
definitions that overlook smaller, yet noteworthy competitors. The
172. Letter from David M. Certner, Legis. Counsel, AARP, Inc., to Richard Cordray,
Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau (July 24, 2012).
173. See generally Rules of Practice, 77 Fed. Reg. 3191 (Jan. 23, 2012) (describing the
FTC's proposed rule to improve investigatory procedures to make them more fair for
respondents).
174. See Certner, supra note 172.
175. Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 40352, 40359 (July 3, 2013).
176. Id. at 40359.
177. Id. at 40353 ("[T]he final rule does not impose on nonbank covered persons any
new substantive requirements ... nonbank covered persons already must comply with
applicable consumer financial law, and a final rule is not necessary to implement the
Bureau's supervisory authority under 12 U.S.C. 5514(a)(1)(C).").
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CFPB is adequately armed to extend its supervision over even the
smallest institutions that choose not to abide by existing laws and
regulations, ensuring a level playing field in markets for consumer
financial products and services. 178
The Final Rule also illustrates how the CFPB is able to use its
authority over nonbanks to establish a national policy for consumer
financial protection.' 79 Its broadly defined UDAAP standard, its data-
driven complaint system, and its informal procedures allow the CFPB to
advance its agenda for transparent, competitive markets through a
hands-off approach. The CFPB cannot practically examine every
nonbank institution for compliance with consumer financial protection
laws, but the threat of supervision under the Final Rule may be adequate
to encourage nonbanks to develop internal compliance and consumer
complaint systems. 180
The CFPB has yet to initiate a proceeding under the Final
Rule, '8 but its ability to retain and defend its power "to regulate the
previously unregulated" will ultimately depend on how it uses its
nonbank supervisory authority. 182 It could use the Final Rule to
supervise institutions offering structured settlement, debt settlement,
credit repair, tax preparation and tax restructuring services. 83
Additionally, it may choose to supervise smaller entities within the
"larger participants" markets, or over all nonbanks within a particular
industry where a systematic violation is identified. 184  Regardless of
which entities become subject to the Final Rule, how the CFPB
manages its power will be crucial to the success of its nonbank
supervision program: "[m]anaged with a deft touch, the agency will
178. Creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency, supra note 16, at 27 (question
from Sen. Charles E. Schumer, to Michael S. Barr, Assistant Secretary for Financial
Institutions, Department of the Treasury).
179. Petrasic & Jabour,supra note 41.
180. See, e.g., Chanin, supra note 166.
181. See Daniel P. Weitzel & Douglas P. Faucette, Nonbanks, Get Ready for Broader
CFPB Oversight, LOCKE LORD QUICK STUDY (July 12, 2013), available at
http://www.lockelord.com/files/Publication/8a274803-9115-44fe-a602-
103efd66bbbb/Preview/PublicationAttachment/c7 1e927b-74bb-4Ocb-98aa-
16fe874556de/bankregtran.2013-07_1 1thCFPBRegulates Weitzel.pdf.
182. Petrasic & Jabour, supra note 41.
183. Wietzel & Faucette, supra note 181.
184. CONS. FIN. SERVS. GRP., BALLARD SPAHR, CFPB FINALIZES PROCEDURES FOR
SUPERVISING NONBANKs ENGAGED IN RISKY CONDUCT (2013), available at
http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2013-07-02-cfpb-finalizes-
procedures-for-supervising-nonbanks-engaged-in-risky-conduct.aspx
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almost assuredly prosper; however, too light a touch or a heavy
hand ... could have repercussions on the U.S. economy as well as for
the ability of U.S. financial firms to compete internationally." 185
DYLAN J. CASTELLINO
185. Petrasic & Jabour, supra note 41.

